

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 05175 01 OF 02 281714Z

43

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INFO DOD

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA 5175

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS I

TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: AMB JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF SEPT 28, 1973

(SALT TWO - 286)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMB JOHNSON
AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF SEPT 28, 1973.

"MR MINISTER:

IT HAS BEEN 16 MONTHS SINCE OUR TWO COUNTRIES SIGNED THE SALT
AGREEMENTS OF 1972 AND OVER 10 MONTHS SINCE WE BEGAN OUR NEGOTIATIONS
HERE IN GENEVA.

IN MAY 1972 OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO CON-
TINUE ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS FOR LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
ARMS. THIS COMMITMENT WAS SET FORTH IN ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY
ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS AND IN
ARTICLES VII AND VIII OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN MEASURES
WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. AS BASIC
GUIDANCE, ARTICLE VII OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT PROVIDES THAT THE
OBLIGATIONS OF THAT AGREEMENT SHALL NOT PREJUDICE THE SCOPE OR
TERMS OF THE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS WHICH

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 05175 01 OF 02 281714Z

MAY BE WORKED OUT IN THE COURSE OF FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS, AND ARTICLE

VIII PROVIDES FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BY AN AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES WITHIN A PERIOD OF NOT MORE THAN FIVE YEARS.

THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS, ALSO SIGNED IN MAY 1972, PROVIDED ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR OUR WORK. THOSE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO OUR PURPOSE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE:

A) THAT NEITHER SIDE SHOULD SEEK UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHER,

B) THAT RECOGNITION OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE TWO PARTIES BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND THE RENUNCIATION OF THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE ARE THE PREREQUISITES TO PEACEFUL RELATIONS, AND

C) THAT THE AGREED BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS DO NOT AFFECT OBLIGATIONS EARLIER ASSUMED BY THE US AND THE USSR TOWARD OTHER COUNTRIES.

THESE DOCUMENTS CONSTITUTED THE AGREED GUIDANCE FOR THE TWO DELEGATIONS WHEN THEY RESUMED WORK IN NOVEMBER 1972.

ON JUNE 21 OF THIS YEAR PRESIDENT NIXON AND GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV SIGNED THE AGREEMENT ON BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FURTHER LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THIS DOCUMENT, PROCEEDING FROM THE MAY 1972 AGREEMENTS, ELABORATED ON EARLIER GUIDANCE BY INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL GUIDELINES.

FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE LEADERS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES FORMALLY RECOGNIZED THE URGENCY OF COMPLETING A PERMANENT AGREEMENT BY COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO MAKE SERIOUS EFFORTS TO WORK OUT THE PROVISIONS OF THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF SIGNING SUCH AN AGREEMENT IN 1974.

FOR THE FIRST TIME, THEY ALSO JOINTLY AFFIRMED THAT LIMITATIONS PLACED ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS CAN APPLY NOT ONLY TO THE QUANTITY OF THESE WEAPONS BUT ALSO TO THEIR QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 05175 01 OF 02 281714Z

IN CONFORMITY WITH THE 1972 AGREEMENTS, PRESIDENT NIXON AND GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV IN JUNE OF THIS YEAR ALSO AFFIRMED SEVERAL GENERAL PRINCIPLES, NAMELY:

-- THAT THE TWO SIDES WILL CONTINUE ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO WORK OUT A PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AS WELL AS THEIR SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION;

-- THAT BOTH SIDES WILL BE GUIDED BY THE RECOGNITION OF EACH OTHER'S EQUAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND BY THE RECOGNITION THAT EFFORTS TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES;

-- THAT LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST BE SUBJECT TO ADEQUATE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS;

-- THAT MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD BE PERMITTED UNDER AGREED CONDITIONS;

- THAT PENDING THE COMPLETION OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT SEPARATE MEASURES TO SUPPLEMENT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT CAN BE AGREED UPON BY THE TWO SIDES.

THUS, THE JUNE 1973 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS AND THE 1972 DOCUMENTS THAT I MENTIONED EARLIER CONSTITUTE THE GUIDELINES FOR OUR NEGOTIATIONS AS AGREED TO AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. THESE ARE THE STANDARDS AGAINST WHICH WE SHOULD MEASURE OUR WORK.

IN CONFORMITY WITH THE 1972 GUIDELINES -- AND INDEED WITH THOSE PRINCIPLES SUBSEQUENTLY AGREED TO IN JUNE 1973 -- THE U.S. ON MARCH 13 OF THIS YEAR PROPOSED THAT THE TWO SIDES AGREE ON AN AGGREGATE NUMBER OF CENTRAL OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS THAT WOULD BE EQUAL FOR THE TWO SIDES. THIS CEILING WOULD CONSTITUTE AN EQUAL UPPER LIMIT ON THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS WHICH EACH SIDE WOULD BE PERMITTED TO HAVE AS OF AN AGREED DATE. THESE ARE THE SYSTEMS WHICH PLAY THE CENTRAL ROLE IN THE STRATEGIC
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 SALT T 05175 01 OF 02 281714Z

BALANCE AND WHICH PROVIDE THE DETERRENCE UPON WHICH THE STABILITY OF THAT BALANCE DEPENDS. THE U.S. FURTHER PROPOSED THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN EQUAL SUBCEILING ON THE NUMBER OF ICBM LAUNCHERS AND AN EQUAL OVER-ALL CEILING ON THE THROW-WEIGHT OF THE ICBM FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES. THE U.S. PROPOSAL THAT THE TWO SIDES AGREE TO THESE EQUAL CEILINGS CONFORMS TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE AND THE RECOGNITION OF EACH OTHER'S EQUAL SECURITY INTERESTS.

ON MAY 8 OF THIS YEAR THE U.S. SPECIFICALLY PROPOSED AN EQUAL AGGREGATE CEILING FOR EACH SIDE OF 2350 ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS WITH APPROPRIATE FREEDOM TO MIX EQUAL FOR BOTH SIDES AND WITH OTHER APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS SIMILARLY EQUAL FOR BOTH SIDES. IN ADDITION, WE STATED OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A PROGRAM FOR SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION IN THE CEILINGS ON

CENTRAL STRATEGIC FORCES FROM THE INITIALLY AGREED LEVELS. THESE PROPOSALS TOOK INTO FULL ACCOUNT THE SOVIET PROPOSALS ADVANCED ON APRIL 6 OF THIS YEAR, AND ARE ALSO IN EXACT CONFORMITY WITH ALL OF THE GUIDELINES TO WHICH I REFERRED EARLIER.

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PAGE 01 SALT T 05175 02 OF 02 281718Z

43

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA 5175

EXDIS/SALT

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IN THE CONTEXT OF AGREEMENT ON THE FOREGOING, OUR PROPOSAL OF MAY 15 ON RECIPROCAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION ASSURANCES CLEARLY CONFORMS WITH THE AGREEMENT EXPRESSED IN THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS IS NOT DIRECTED AGAINST THIRD COUNTRIES AND THEIR INTERESTS, AND THAT THESE UNDERTAKINGS DO NOT AFFECT ANY OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO OTHER COUNTRIES EARLIER ASSUMED BY THE U.S. AND THE USSR. IT IS ALSO CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF RECOGNITION OF EACH OTHER'S EQUAL SECURITY INTERESTS, WHICH, AS THE U.S. HAS MADE CLEAR, ENCOMPASSES THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF OUR ALLIES. SUCH ASSURANCES WOULD PROVIDE A DEFINITIVE SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS IN THAT THEY WOULD PRECLUDE THE ATTAINMENT OF A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE BY EITHER SIDE THROUGH THE DEPLOYMENT OF SYSTEMS NOT LIMITED BY THE AGREEMENT.

ON MAY 11 THE U.S. PROPOSED A PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT TO FREEZE THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLE SYSTEMS FOR ICBMS. THIS PROPOSAL CONFORMS TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLE WHICH ALLOWS FOR SEPARATE MEASURES PENDING COMPLETION OF THE

PERMANENT AGREEMENT. IT IS ALSO CONSISTENT WITH THE JUNE 1973 BASIC PRINCIPLE WHICH PROVIDED THAT LIMITATIONS CAN APPLY TO QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT. WE HAVE SAID THAT, SHOULD THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT INCORPORATE LIMITATIONS ON MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLE SYSTEMS AT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 05175 02 OF 02 281718Z

LEAST AS ADEQUATE AS THOSE WE HAVE PROPOSED FOR THE PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE WITHOUT THE NECESSITY FOR PRECISE EQUALITY IN THE NUMBER OF ICBM LAUNCHERS AND THE THROW-WEIGHT OF THE MISSILES WHICH COULD BE LAUNCHED FROM THOSE LAUNCHERS.

THESE PROPOSALS TAKEN TOGETHER WOULD PROVIDE BOTH ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE IN CENTRAL SYSTEMS AND A DEFINITIVE SOLUTION FOR NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS. THEY PROVIDE CLEAR RECOGNITION OF THE EQUAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES WITH NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

IN SUMMARY, MR. MINISTER, OUR TWO DELEGATIONS HAVE RECEIVED THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE DIRECTION REGARDING THE PRINCIPLES THAT ARE TO GUIDE OUR NEGOTIATIONS. THE PROPOSALS ADVANCED BY THE U.S. FOR A PERMANENT AGREEMENT TO REPLACE THE INTERIM AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND FOR A PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT RELATING TO CONSTRAINTS ON MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLE SYSTEMS FULLY CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLES AGREED TO IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON. IT IS IN CONFORMITY WITH THESE PRINCIPLES THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO REACH A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON LIMITATIONS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.
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